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1 Introduction 
William James Ashley (1860-1927) was one of the leading historical economists of 
his generation and, along with Archdeacon William Cunningham and William 
Albert Hewins, he was instrumental in harnessing historicist principles to support 
the corporatist-cum-protectionist movement that grew to prominence in the late-
Victorian and Edwardian periods. Ashley’s influence on the formation of policy 
within this movement reached its peak with the publication in 1903 of The Tariff 
Problem, which was issued shortly after the mercurial Joseph Chamberlain 
launched his political campaign to reintroduce a tariff structure in Great Britain. 
Ashley’s active participation in this protectionist revival was manifestly 
the product of the same social, economic and political stimuli that then spurred a 
number of his contemporaries to turn to protectionist policies. It is now evident that 
many Britons were willing to consider alternatives to the once sacred policy of free 
trade because of their loss of confidence in their nation’s capacity to maintain its 
premier position in the world. This loss of self-belief was, amongst other things, 
driven by the increasing industrial strength of Imperial Germany and the United 
States; the poor performance of the English army on the veldt of Southern Africa; 
Britain’s declining share of world trade in its chief manufacturing staples of cotton 
textiles and machine tools; the entrenched poverty and persistent industrial unrest in 
the face of economic growth; and an expanding chorus of eugenicists asserting that 
an unworthy under-class would soon drag down the English middle classes. The 
mood of a number of intellectual elites, ranging from jingoistic imperialists who 
knew no better and Fabians who should have known better, consequently swung 
behind Chamberlain’s call for immediate national rebirth within an Imperial 
Zollverein. This national renewal entailed rejecting the time-honoured Victorian 
policies of free trade, Gladstonian finance, Smilesian self-help and a loose 
federation of loyal colonies for the National Efficiency policies of protection, state 
capitalism, a welfare state and a self-contained Empire (see Semmel 1960; Amery 
1969; Coats 1968, 1992; Searle 1971). Ashley was no less caught up in this mood 
swing, and designed much of The Tariff Problem to supply Chamberlain’s tariff-
reform movement with some academic credibility. 
This rather conventional account of the rise of the tariff reform 
movement—which is in itself sound and no doubt highlights causal relationships 
that were merely the outward manifestations of the deeper forces delineated by 
J.A. Hobson, V. I. Lenin, J. A.  Schumpeter and other high theorists—unfortunately 
fails to capture the more personal, if not singular, experiences that motivated 
individuals, such as Ashley, to throw their lot in with Chamberlain. It is with these 
more personal stimuli that I am chiefly concerned in the centenary appraisal of The 
Tariff Problem that follows. It is my contention that Ashley’s protectionist 
manifesto was, just as much as these deeper causal processes, the product of the 
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vagaries of trade that he witnessed when growing up in the slums of London, the 
historicist doctrines that he developed while studying within the Oxford History 
School, and the actions of the large industrial trusts that he observed during his long 
tenure in North America. Indeed, it is my belief that some passages in this 
protectionist manifesto cannot be properly understood, or at least do not impart 
their full resonance, until Ashley’s social and intellectual background is brought 
into the foreground. This historiographical approach merely reflects the obvious but 
too often underplayed fact that historical actors are driven by more forces than just 
one or two grand causal processes that can be straight-jacketed into a theoretical 
framework. There are four sections to the paper. In section two I trace Ashley’s 
extraordinary career prior to the publication of The Tariff Problem and emphasise, 
in particular, those experiences that shaped his views on protection. In section three 
I review The Tariff Problem itself and delineate the way in which many of the ideas 
contained therein are the direct product of Ashley’s experiences in the preceding 
decades. In section four I provide a brief account of Ashley’s equally rich career 
after the publication of The Tariff Problem and conclude the paper. 
2 The Trials of an Oxford-educated Parvenu 
Ashley became one of the first, if not the first, of the many awkward working-class 
youths to be subjected to that great New Liberal experiment of ‘cherry picking’ the 
best and brightest from the slums for cultural elevation at the two established 
universities. He was, indeed, a member of the Victorian constituency that the 
Coleridgian clerisy deemed to be most in need of edifying ‘sweetness and light’, 
namely, the majority of the coarse-grained working poor who adhered to one of the 
Nonconformist faiths. Ashley was raised in respectable poverty by plain-living 
Baptists in Bermondsey, which was then still the notorious riverside slum in South 
London that, a generation earlier, had inspired some of Charles Dickens’s more 
disturbing scenes of social and economic deprivation. His father was an honest 
journeyman hatter, whose living from shaping silk hats by the light from the 
basement vent was occasionally put at risk by the dislocation caused by the 
introduction of new machines in this trade, whilst his mother, who was confronted 
with raising a family in wretched fog-bound streets that were intersected by the 
malodorous watercourses feeding the Bermondsey tanneries, cared for eight 
children. These hard years affected Ashley deeply and he often made indirect 
reference to them in his learned works. There is little doubt, for instance, that the 
plight of his father’s cyclical underemployment influenced his later inclination to 
distrust the fundamental premises of orthodox economics, such as the mobility of 
labour, and underpinned his belief that there was too much ‘worship of the 
consumer’ within economic discourse. It certainly drove the earnestness with which 
he portrayed trusts, combines, collective bargaining, centralised arbitration and 
tariffs as means to ensure reasonable wages, regular employment and social 
amelioration, rather than as innovations engineered by vested interests to 
appropriate consumer surplus (see 1890 [1966], pp. 363-76; 1900 [1966], pp. 394-
7). As his daughter related: ‘Industrial conditions were no abstract study to one who 
in after years looked at the grating which alone admitted air and daylight to the 
basement room, “comfortable enough as workshops then went”, where his father 
had worked, and wondered how far it was responsible for the asthma which 
disturbed his later years’ (A. Ashley 1932, p. 17). 
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Ashley miraculously escaped the near-choiceless world of his youth 
through academic precocity and, ultimately, by winning the 1878 Brackenbury 
History scholarship to Balliol College, which was then steered by New Liberal 
principles under the mastership of the legendary Benjamin Jowett. Ashley himself 
recalled Jowett preaching that one of the ideals of the work and office of the 
university was to provide a bridge that might unite the different classes and 
religions of society, and hence to assist able men from poor social backgrounds 
who were handicapped by the vices of shyness, awkwardness, self-consciousness 
and bad manners (1897 [1966], p. 445). Ashley, however, regrettably had to admit 
that Jowett’s new-fangled policy to make the college undergraduate body more 
composite in origin—‘from the earl down, or up, to the clever son of the artisan’—
was something of a failure, since no quantity of college songs or tutorial ‘tea and 
toast’ could make headway against the ‘centrifugal forces’ acting against class 
interaction (ibid.). His social isolation from the public-school-dominated sets at 
Balliol was doubtlessly magnified, and his life almost certainly made miserable, by 
a slight speech impediment, crippling shyness and a non-athletic disposition. 
Ashley nonetheless took account of his unique opportunity for social and 
intellectual advancement. He soaked up the high moral tone that permeated Oxford 
at this time and, in particular, embraced the noble ideal promoted by charismatic 
figures such as Jowett and T.H. Green (and executed with a neo-mercantilist twist 
by the famous Balliol diasporas, from Lord Milner to Leo Amery) that it was the 
mission of every capable university man to administrate a just Empire in which 
individuals had the greatest scope for self-advancement and self-fulfilment. Ashley 
also studiously devoted long hours to mastering the historiographical principles of 
the Oxford Historical School. The great constitutional historian and natural leader 
of this school, William Stubbs, taught him that historical research should entail an 
objective assessment of the development of institutions, rather than a picturesque 
depiction of the lives of Kings and Queens, while the beatific economic historian, 
Arnold Toynbee, inspired him to employ this institutionally-driven historicism in 
the field of political economy. This historical training, in turn, made Ashley 
amenable to the ideas that were then being promoted within the German historical 
schools, especially by Gustav Schmoller, who was rapidly becoming one of the 
leading apologists for the protectionist policies of Imperial Germany. Ashley later 
wrote that his early views were formed ‘under the converging influence of three 
very different men—Stubbs, Toynbee, and Schmoller’ (1913, p. 165). 
Ashley bore the trials of these undergraduate years stoically and seemed 
destined for a college fellowship after obtaining a first in modern history in 1881, 
winning the prestigious Lothian prize in 1882 for a history of two fourteenth-
century Flemish statesmen (which he published in 1883) and, following the early 
demise of Toynbee from ‘brain fever’, polishing his and a fellow student’s notes of 
Toynbee’s famous Saturday lectures on economic progress for publication as The 
Industrial Revolution (1884). The shy and retiring Ashley was, for all this, still 
perceived as the typical parvenu and he was forced to sit five fellowship 
examinations, and wait four years, before being admitted to the club of gentlemanly 
academics. In the case of one college, All Souls, the electors declined to accept any 
of the applicants, and Ashley himself believed that his failure was due to his lack of 
‘social graces’, while in the case of another college, the name of which Ashley 
wished to keep anonymous, rumours circulated that the dons rejected the 
recommendation of the external examiners because they ‘did not think him the sort 
of man they wanted for their type of student’ (A. Ashley 1932, p. 23). He was 
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finally (and mercifully) elected to a fellowship at Lincoln in 1885, after favourable 
examination reports from Stubbs and Arthur Johnson. The sad fact was, however, 
that a number of scholars probably never accepted Ashley as a fit member of the 
academic clerisy. Some thought him rather common and even the most open-
hearted of the Cambridge economists, Henry Sidgwick, deemed Ashley’s speech 
impediment to be sufficiently severe to make him an ‘unsafe’ experiment as the 
inaugural lecturer of the Toynbee Trust in 1884 (see Whitaker 1996, Volume 1, 
p. 174n1). The other Cambridge economists were fortunately more willing to focus 
on Ashley’s noble character and obvious talents as an historical economist: John 
Neville Keynes recorded in his diary in 1885 that he disagreed with Ashley on the 
subject of economic method, but ‘liked the man—especially his frankness and 
straightforwardness’, and when Ashley was residing in North America in the early 
1890s Alfred Marshall wrote to Frank W. Taussig that ‘I can sooner forgive you for 
winning the American Cup, than for stealing him’ (Keynes’s Diary, 7 September 
1885, ADD 7834; Marshall to Taussig 13 October 1893, in Whitaker 1996, 
Volume 2. p. 99). Ashley also luckily found some acceptance amongst the 
postgraduates and young lecturers at Oxford, especially at the Oxford Economic 
Society, which was founded in 1886 and was constituted by young scholars, such as 
Langford Price and Arthur Ball, who were, like Ashley, disposed to the use of the 
historical method in economics (see Ashley to J.K. Ingram, 26 November 1887, 
Ingram Papers, which contains a full account of the Oxford Economic Society, and 
Kadish 1982). 
Ashley, having finally reached this first rung of the academic greasy pole, 
quickly discovered that he drew little satisfaction from the insular world of Oxford. 
Like most English working-class scholars cursed with shyness and confronted with 
class prejudice, he ultimately sought happiness by embracing married life and 
accepting positions in the less custom-bound New World, first as professor of 
Political Economy and Constitutional History at the University of Toronto in 1888 
and then, after some half-hearted negotiations with the University of Sydney, as the 
inaugural Professor of Economic History at Harvard in 1892. Ashley rewarded the 
administrators of the North American universities for their foresight in hiring him 
by publishing his magnum opus, An Introduction to English Economic History and 
Theory, the first part of which appeared in 1888 and the second in 1893. This 
publication grew out of the lectures Ashley had delivered at Oxford between 1885 
and 1888 and the lectures themselves were, as one would expect from a graduate of 
the Oxford Historical School, designed to demonstrate that the activities and 
thought of the medieval economic agent were a function of England’s evolving 
institutional environment. The Introduction is, however, not the pioneering 
economic history it is sometimes thought to be and, to some extent, Ashley simply 
confined himself to dexterous dovetailing of existing German historical 
scholarship, which was then still little known in England, with the primary sources 
discovered and described by Stubbs, Cunningham and Frederic Seebohm. Ashley 
was, of course, the first to acknowledge his debts to his forerunners, and the 
derivative nature of the work was readily recognised by his reviewers, peers and 
obituarists (see Ashley 1891, p. 152; 1907, p. 482; Gras 1927, p. 20; Scott 1928, 
p. 319; MacDonald 1942, p. 27; Harte 1971). These commentators instead waxed 
lyrical about his capacity to maintain narrative style without sacrificing objectivity 
and applauded the skill with which he used this narrative to exemplify the 
principles of the English historical school of economics. The latter of these qualities 
was particularly important, since, unlike most other English historical economists, 
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Ashley not only sermonised on the value of the key historicist principles of 
Baconian induction, historical dynamics and doctrinal relativism, but also strove to 
construct concrete generalisations guided by these prescriptions. It was the best 
response to those critics of historical economics, such as John Sheilds Nicholson, 
who were thoroughly sick of ‘inquisitions on method’ by historical economists and 
demanded less boastful methodological ‘talk’ and more theoretical ‘action’ 
(Keynes’s Diary, 2 June 1885, ADD 7834). Ashley was particularly effective in 
providing accounts of the dynamic laws of historical development, which, because 
of their importance to Ashley’s later support for tariff reform, deserve more 
detailed comment. 
Ashley insisted that the construction of laws that govern the economic 
evolution of a society should take priority over the construction of static laws (such 
as the theories of neoclassical economics) that govern economic exchanges within a 
given society. He maintained, with obvious reference to the neoclassical position of 
the Marshallian camp at Cambridge, that the purpose of historical inquiry was not 
to construct generalisations that were ‘mere corrections or amplifications of current 
economic doctrines’, but rather to build generalisations that would reveal the 
‘character and sequence of the stages of economic development’ (1893 [1966], 
p. 7). These stadial laws, moreover, should be collectivist and institutional in 
character, rather than individualistic and psychological, and trace the life and 
evolution through time of specific industries, classes, civic formations and other 
institutional structures (ibid., p. 16; 1899a [1966], p. 24; 1914 [1949], pp. 1-2). 
Ashley was therefore effectively rejecting the grand historicist approach associated 
with Karl Marx and Auguste Comte, in which history is partitioned by taking 
successive cross-sections of the entire social organism, in favour of the less 
ambitious historicist approach embraced by the German historical economists, in 
which history is partitioned by taking successive cross-sections of specific 
institutions that each constitute only a part of the social organism. The latter 
method, which mirrored the proto-institutionalist approach championed by 
Schmoller, and which Thorstein Veblen called ‘post-Darwinistic causal theory’, 
allows the historian to assemble the historical details drawn from careful readings 
of original manuscripts to construct the various longitudinal strands that, 
eventually, may be woven together to provide a faint outline of the larger evolving 
social organism (see also Lane 1956, p. 15; Veblen 1902 [1919], p. 264). This 
proto-institutionalist approach thereby ends where the Marxist-cum-Comtist 
approach is purported to begin and hence, ultimately, leaves the historian with a 
conception of the way in which the evolving social organism shapes the actions and 
theories of the economic agents. Such historicism sat well with the other precepts 
important to the English and German historical schools, such as the empiricism of 
bastardised Baconianism and doctrinal relativism, since the longitudinal strands 
were to be constructed by cautious, incremental inductions (read tedious Teutonic 
scholarship), and economic doctrines were deemed to be applicable only to those 
partitioned stages of economic development in which they were created. 
Ashley delineated four of these stadial laws in the Introduction: an 
agricultural sequence loosely based on the work of Wilhelm Roscher (a progression 
of open-field, enclosed-convertible-husbandry and rotation-of-the-crops systems); 
an industrial organisation sequence based on the work of Adolph Held and others (a 
progression of family, guild, domestic and factory systems of production); a means-
of-exchange sequence based on the work of Bruno Hildebrand and others 
(a progression of barter, money and credit systems); and a corporate-entity 
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sequence based on the work of Schmoller (a progression of village, town, territory, 
national corporate-structures) (Ashley 1888-1893 [1906], Volume 1, pp. 43, 65; 
Volume 2, pp. 5, 8, 219ff, 251, 262; see also 1914 [1949], pp. 35-6). Surprisingly, 
however, Ashley made no reference to Frederic List’s stadial sequence—so popular 
amongst protectionists—in which tariffs are considered appropriate in certain 
stages of the evolution of the national economy. It is also important to note that 
Ashley’s implicit methodology protects these stadial laws from a number (but 
definitely not all) of the criticisms later levelled at historicism by Karl Popper, 
Friedrich von Hayek and Alexander Gerschenkron. Ashley was not, for example, a 
simple-minded historical determinist and, indeed, he suggested that an inventory of 
‘necessary and sufficient’ causes needed to be in place before a stadial development 
took place. This meant that if a necessary cause was absent, or an alternative set of 
causes present, the stadial transition would not take place (see, for example, 
Ashley’s denial that Schmoller’s corporate sequence was strictly applicable in 
England (1888-1893 [1906], Volume 2, pp. 8-10). Ashley also anticipated 
Gerschenkron by arguing that only the pioneering industry or institution need 
traverse each stage of the stadial formula, since it was possible for the backward 
entity to imitate the leading entity (ibid., pp. 221, 262; 1914 [1949], p. 34). Finally, 
Ashley insisted that stage demarcations should not be treated as rigidly distinct, 
since any number of intermediate arrangements was both possible and to be found, 
and because each historically specific stage was only a ‘convenient expression’, the 
defining characteristics of which could be found in earlier or later stages. In this 
regard, Ashley laid particular stress on survivals—an idea which had recently been 
popularised by E.B. Tylor (Ashley 1888-1893 [1906], Volume 2, pp. 43, 200-1). 
Ashley used this historicist methodology to interpret the transformation of 
industry that took place towards the end of the Victorian age. Drawing upon his 
eyewitness accounts of North American industry, he wrote numerous learned 
monographs in the 1890s on the rise of a new stage of economic development that 
was dominated by capital-intensive trusts. He maintained that the world was no 
longer governed by atomistic consumers, labourers, entrepreneurs and rentiers 
trading within a competitive framework of atomistic firms, but was instead driven 
by trade unions, company managers and bureaucrats struggling for supremacy 
within an oligopolistic framework of capital-intensive corporations. Ashley 
therefore argued that it was imperative that the state adopt a corporatist outlook 
and, instead of relying on the competitive price mechanism, cooperate with capital 
and labour to allocate resources efficiently. These papers—which contained the 
superstructure for his growing (but then guarded) support for protection, arbitration 
boards, the municipal ownership of key services, and social insurance schemes—
were collected together in Surveys: Historic and Economic (1900 [1966]). This 
publication also included a series of historical monographs and several articles and 
addresses that defended the historicist principles in the face of the Cambridge 
campaign, led by Sidgwick, Keynes and Marshall, to reinterpret historicism in a 
way that would make it compatible with the Marshallian version of the neoclassical 
framework (see Moore 2003). Ashley recognised that his Cambridge 
contemporaries were attempting to be conciliatory, and he understood that most of 
the heated exchanges that defined the debates over method at this time were 
needlessly destructive, but he nonetheless felt obliged, coolly and politely, to hold 
his ground. He particularly took issue with the Cambridge economists’ canonical, 
rather than relativist, interpretation of the history of economic doctrine. In an article 
for the Economic Journal entitled ‘The Rehabilitation of Ricardo’ (1891), which is 
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now strangely Ashley’s best-known article, he challenged Marshall’s attempt to 
reinterpret Ricardo’s labour theory of value as an early version of the modern value 
theory rather than as a distinct doctrine that reflected the conditions of the age in 
which it was written. Indeed, once again confirming that most modern 
controversies are merely old wines in new bottles, Ashley concluded that the 
exegeses offered by Karl Marx and Johann Rodbertus were more accurate accounts 
of the Ricardian doctrines than those offered by the members of the Marshallian 
School. 
Ashley’s refusal to bow to the Cambridge juggernaut must have rankled 
with Marshall, and the latter did in fact write a reply to Ashley’s article on the 
interpretation of Ricardo, but, following his usual policy of avoiding controversy at 
all costs, he declined to publish it (see Groenewegen 1995, p. 418). Marshall, 
whose attitudes towards both ideas and colleagues were always vexingly complex, 
nonetheless continued to place Ashley’s historical scholarship well above the mean 
and he subsequently chose to support Ashley over the perennially passed-over 
Herbert S. Foxwell during the election that determined the inaugural head of the 
Faculty of Commerce at the University of Birmingham, the first such faculty in a 
British University and the second (to Adelaide University) in the Empire (see 
Letters 625, 649, 650, 780 from Marshall to various correspondents in Whitaker 
1996). Ashley returned from North America to take up the Birmingham chair in 
1901 and deliberately sought, from the very start, to provide a curriculum that 
would be more empirical, historical and vocational than that provided by Marshall 
at Cambridge (see Muirhead 1932; Kadish 1991). Ashley believed that a technical 
education in the field of commerce would help counter the growing competitive 
advantage of Britain’s trade rivals, produce high-minded captains of industry who 
would have one eye on the public weal and the other on profits, and turn out an 
army of competent middle managers who could run the Empire along efficient, 
scientific lines. It was from Birmingham University that Ashley wrote The Tariff 
Problem and readily joined Chamberlain, who was a Brummagem and instrumental 
in the foundation of Birmingham University, in his campaign to re-introduce a tariff 
structure in Britain. 
3 The Tariff Problem 
The precise mechanics of the wider tariff reform campaign are beyond the limited 
compass of this centenary article and, in any event, the whole Byzantine affair has 
already been analysed far more competently by the numerous historians of note 
cited in the introduction to this paper. It is sufficient here to stress only that Ashley 
and a number of other historical economists lent support to this campaign at a time 
when the majority of orthodox economists were casting the pall of ‘voodoo 
economics’ over the case for tariff reform. Ashley was already in the process of 
putting material together for a book on the subject of protection in May 1903 when, 
like the rest of the public, he was surprised by Chamberlain’s political gamble to 
support tariff reform (Amery 1969, p. 289). He immediately wrote to Chamberlain 
of his projected book and Chamberlain, realising that he needed a modicum of 
scientific authority to underpin his political programme, wrote back enthusiastically 
to encourage Ashley’s research. Ashley, in turn, put everything aside to accelerate 
the progress of his book, which became even more important for the success of 
Chamberlain’s campaign when, in August 1903, fourteen of the leading economists 
in England, including Marshall, submitted the now infamous letter to The Times 
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stating that economic theory underpinned the policy of free trade (see Coats 1964, 
1968). A number of economists with historicist sympathies, such as Ashley, 
Foxwell and Hewins, issued counter letters in September of that year, but the status 
of these authors hardly matched the authority provided by the phalanx of the 
fourteen economists who had signed The Times manifesto. A solid scholarly tome 
was therefore needed to provide the tariff reform movement with academic 
credentials, and hence Ashley’s The Tariff Problem appeared at a strategic point in 
time. The conservative parliamentarian and future prime minister, Andrew Bonar 
Law, certainly believed that scientific authority was the key to the success of the 
campaign, writing to Ashley in December 1904: ‘There is one point, however, 
which, if you agree with me as to its importance, I wish you would bring to the 
notice of Mr. Chamberlain. There is nothing, I think, which tells more against us 
than the idea that scientific authority is against us’ (letter reprinted in A. Ashley 
1925, p. 135). Joseph Chamberlain was equally grateful for Ashley’s contribution, 
stating that Ashley’s monograph was ‘the best manual we have from the economic 
point of view’ (letter reprinted in A. Ashley 1932, p. 127). Ashley himself, 
however, was concerned that his book would lose its scientific authority if it was 
seen as yet another piece of propaganda issued by the Chamberlain camp. He was 
therefore ever ready to emphasise that the construction of the book was underway 
before Chamberlain had embarked upon his campaign; that both he and 
Chamberlain had formed their views on protection independently from one another; 
that neither he nor Chamberlain was responsible for what the other wrote or said; 
and that it was a mere accident that Ashley had become professor of the university 
that Chamberlain, the leading father of Birmingham, was instrumental in creating 
(see Ashley to J. Morley, 9 February 1904, reprinted in Coats 1968, pp. 222-3). 
Few doubted Ashley’s sincerity, and The Tariff Problem went through four 
editions: the first two in 1903, a third (with a lengthy introduction) in 1911, and a 
fourth in 1920. The book has also subsequently been reprinted twice: in 1968 
within the Augustus M. Kelley economic text series, and in 1998 within a 
Routledge/ Thommes Press series entitled The Ideals of Empire. 
Ashley’s The Tariff Problem opens with an extended history of the 
theoretical arguments advanced in favour of protection. The literature on 
international commerce is assiduously surveyed to delineate very nearly every pro-
protection argument considered since David Hume. Thus each qualification made 
by Adam Smith, each concession granted by John Stuart Mill, and each special case 
admitted by countless other notable free traders from the Classical age, are duly 
noted and discussed. This approach was clearly designed to challenge the authority 
of the academic free-traders who had signed The Times manifesto (a document to 
which Ashley does not expressly make reference) and their implied contention that 
the ‘science’ of economics somehow endorsed free trade policies. Ashley does not, 
of course, reject the main free trade argument that protective duties tend to divert 
resources from more to less advantageous material ends and hence to induce 
consumers to pay higher exchange values for commodities produced domestically 
that were once imported less expensively from abroad. He merely argues that this is 
no more than a tendency and that, once other considerations are taken into account, 
the movement towards higher exchange values may either be offset by stronger 
countervailing tendencies or be a price worth incurring to gain other non-material 
advantages. Ashley argued, for example, that the tariff-induced increase in present 
exchangeable values may be more than offset by a fall in future exchangeable 
values caused by an increase in the productive power within the protected 
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industries (the infant industry argument); that tariffs may prevent the hardships 
caused by the sudden destruction of a domestic industry, particularly if, because of 
the lack of labour mobility, the workers from this industry are thrown out of work 
for a considerable period of time (the ‘friction’ argument); that tariffs may act as a 
useful bargaining tool to derive commercial concessions from trade competitors, 
especially those competitors who practise dumping (the retaliatory tariff argument); 
and that tariffs and other protective measures, such as the famous Navigation Laws, 
may protect those industries that are essential for the defence or health of the nation 
(Smith’s national security argument). Ashley therefore insisted that the case for free 
trade or protection is an issue that should be decided by an empirical study of the 
relative causal processes and non-material considerations and should in no way turn 
on a single, a priori theoretical argument. It is in this context that he invoked the 
orthodox authorities of Henry Sidgwick (1885) and William Stanley Jevons (1882), 
both of whom had argued, at least in relation to domestic commerce, that there are 
grounds for interfering with the freedom of trade if the ‘empirical certainty’ of a 
situation outweighs the theoretical probability that individuals are best served by 
allowing them to pursue their own interests. This admission was the end product of 
many decades of debate over method between the historical and orthodox 
economists and was, Ashley argued, just as relevant to international commerce as it 
was to domestic commerce. 
The rest of the book is given over to proving that the ‘empirical certainty’ 
of the situation in Edwardian Britain dictated that protection, preferably in the form 
of reciprocal tariff agreements with the dominions of the Empire, was the preferred 
trade policy. The precise means by which Ashley makes this case were, I believe, 
manifestly driven by the evolutionary vision and doctrinal relativism that he had 
embraced while he was a student at Oxford and which I have delineated in the 
previous section. Specifically, Ashley buttresses the four aforementioned 
protectionist arguments, which he readily admits were generally regarded as 
unimportant special cases at the time in which they were articulated, by contending 
that these ‘qualifications’ have become more, not less, relevant to the modern 
industrial world of Great Britain and her Empire. This is because, through the 
passage of time, the economies of Britain and her competitors had ascended to a 
new stage of economic development in which the protectionist special case had 
become the general case. Thus, although Ashley believed that the commercial 
policy of free trade in the early nineteenth century had probably been taken too far, 
it was, he argued, the product of the industrial realities (and philosophical 
principles) of that time and was therefore conducive to economic growth in that age 
rather than the Edwardian age. The main industrial development to which he 
attributed the new industrial realities of the modern age was the growth of the 
capital-intensive trusts, strategically located next to cheap natural-resource 
deposits, in the United States, Imperial Germany and, to a far lesser extent, in Great 
Britain itself. Indeed, Ashley anticipated the next generation of Cambridge 
economists, and patently drew upon his first-hand observation of the rise of trusts 
during his prolonged stay in the United States, to argue that these capital-intensive 
conglomerates bore no relation to the small commercial firms upon which Adam 
Smith had based his theories, and that it was therefore necessary to undertake a 
‘complete revision of the ordinary doctrine of exchange value’ (1903, p. 87). 
Ashley focused, in particular, on the way in which the new capital-
intensive industries of the United States and Imperial Germany employed dumping 
policies at strategic points in the business cycle, and hence on the need for Britain 
62 History of Economics Review 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
to introduce defensive and retaliatory tariffs. The trusts of the United States were 
particularly dangerous because of their ability to concentrate massive amounts of 
capital to service a vast domestic market protected by a tariff wall. Ashley drew 
upon a myriad of US business reports and a fascinating study by Arthur Twining 
Hadley on railway rates, entitled Railroad Transportation: Its History and Laws 
(1888), to argue that such capital-intensive industries are more inclined to 
undertake dumping policies during cyclical downturns. Specifically, Ashley 
advanced the now common account of the need for capital-intensive industries to 
continue producing while incurring a loss during periods of low prices; namely, the 
situation in which the price per unit falls to a point where the revenue derived 
covers variable costs, but not total costs, so that a portion of the fixed costs may be 
serviced and the loss from closing down is greater than the loss from remaining 
open. Ashley believed that this situation encouraged dumping because, instead of 
closing down, the capital-intensive firms desperately attempt to exploit foreign 
markets in order to utilise their idle industrial capacity to gain the revenue needed 
to break even. Dumping, in short, was due to the ‘inexorable needs of fixed capital’ 
(1903, p. 91). Ashley added that the ability of the US firms to disperse the massive 
fixed costs over a large volume of output, and to exploit economies of scale, 
induces managers to use dumping as a means by which to derive larger profits 
through price discrimination (although he did not use this term). In his words: ‘a 
foreign sale at a very low price added to a home sale at a higher price may produce 
a greater net profit than the home sale alone at the high price, since its cost of 
production would then be relatively higher’ (1903, p. 92). The tariff wall would, 
moreover, enable the trust to depress the export price relative to the domestic price 
by a magnitude greater than the cost of re-transportation. Ashley, in short, did not 
feel that he had to spell out the obvious threat of permanent lower prices from the 
capital-intensive trusts, and instead dwelt on the threat of cyclical dumping. He 
believed that the industrial mills of the modern age had to keep running at high 
volumes, and this was, contrary to the Classical vision of the market economy (in 
which crises induce immediate retrenchment), even more important when the mills 
were confronted with losses during cyclical downturns. 
The cyclical dumping exercised by the over-capitalised trusts would also 
have serious consequences for labour conditions in a world in which the orthodox 
postulate of perfect labour mobility was implausible. As shown in the previous 
section, Ashley was preoccupied with the dangers of the irregular employment that 
he had witnessed when he was growing up in the slums of Bermondsey. He 
believed that unemployment resulting from labour immobility becomes more, not 
less, of a problem with the increased prevalence of highly specialised skills. In his 
own highly personal words: ‘My own impression, based on some little observation, 
is that in the more highly skilled crafts there is exceedingly little fluidity—that men 
cling to customary occupation, in which they have a special skill, with a pathetic 
(or, if you please, a stupid) persistency’ (1903, p. 35). He implied that this skill-
induced immobility gave rise to labour compartmentalisation, or what a later 
generation of economists would, with a little more theoretical sophistication, call 
dual labour markets and an earlier generation would call non-competing groups. 
Ashley added that this was less of a problem in earlier stages of historical 
development. Citing the work of his undergraduate hero, Arnold Toynbee, he 
argued that the assumption of perfect labour mobility was more relevant in the days 
of Adam Smith because of the extent to which labourers of that age retained close 
links to alternative forms of employment (especially agricultural employment) 
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when they worked within the then dominant domestic system of the production 
(which was the third stage in the industrial organisation stadial law described in the 
previous section) (1903, p. 35). He also believed that it was far better to have a 
stable industry than one that lurched ceaselessly from prosperity to depression and 
back again. In his words: ‘All observers of working-class life will agree that a 
period of low wages and of partial or complete unemployment has a negative and 
degrading effect, far greater than the positive elevating effect of a period of high 
wages and overtime’ (1903, p. 116). The temporary gains to the consumers from 
low-priced goods, dumped on Britain’s shores from abroad, consequently could not 
compensate for the losses caused by the associated dislocation in the labour market. 
Again in his words: ‘The death of a great staple industry, which has let down its 
roots so deeply, will try to the utmost our reliance on the “transferability of labour”. 
If only from the motives of “humanity” which even Adam Smith recognised, we 
shall be almost compelled to ease the transition by temporary measures of defence’ 
(1903, p. 117). 
Ashley, for all this, accepted the traditional free trade argument that 
dislocated resources are ultimately reallocated and that there is a long-run tendency 
for each nation to pay for its imports with exported goods and services. He 
therefore did not accept that the immobility of labour would permanently hinder the 
growth of the new industries that were needed to replace the declining industries, 
and he certainly did not, in Hobsonian fashion, accept that there could be a 
permanent malaise in aggregate domestic production because of a declining export 
sector. Ashley did, however, raise the serious issue of the nature of the new export 
industries that would replace the old staples. In other words, his over-riding interest 
in the long term was less in the aggregate amount of trade and more with the kind 
of trade undertaken by Britain in the future. He argued that, with the decline in coal 
reserves and goods produced by capital-intensive means, the new export industries 
emerging to fund the required imports were demonstrably of the sort that exploited 
cheap labour in the slums of London. Britain, he argued, was being transformed 
into a nation of under-skilled, undernourished slum dwellers. He did not invoke 
H.G. Wells’s futuristic world of subterranean trolls, which was a vision commonly 
enough articulated in Edwardian times, nor did he explicitly make reference to the 
New Liberal ideals he had embraced as an undergraduate that made it requisite 
upon a Balliol man to help men look beyond this base and brutal world. His fear 
that individuals would not have the freedom to develop their own characters to 
achieve their true ends in life because of grinding material poverty was nonetheless 
palpable. Ashley, of course, over-stated the British trend towards the slavery of 
slum employment, and indeed his depressing vision of a future land of cheap labour 
obviously spurred his excessive zeal in making vocational education succeed at 
Birmingham University. But although he may have miscalculated in absolute terms, 
he was obviously accurate in relative terms. This is because nations such as the 
United States were clearly outpacing Britain in the creation of industries that 
provided high-skilled, capital-intensive, high-wage employment. Ashley added, 
moreover, that the new low-wage industries emerging in the cities of Britain were 
not the sort required for national defence. Ashley concurred with Smith that 
defence is more important than opulence (1903, p. 118), and hence although 
shipbuilders, engineering firms and labourers would prosper in the short term from 
cut-price steel and cheap wheat dumped on Britain’s shores, the long-term 
consequences would be an over-reliance on vital imports in times of war. Britain, at 
worst, would ultimately be enslaved in more ways than one and, at best, become an 
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economic and social backwater. How close these statements approached the truth 
was ultimately made apparent in the desperate wars Britain fought against the 
various totalitarian states during the century that followed. 
It is clear, in short, that Ashley’s Heraclitean vision of continuous 
industrial change induced him to look forward to the emerging stage of corporate 
capitalism rather than backwards to the fading stage of atomistic capitalism; that his 
prolonged residency in North America allowed him to witness the growth of this 
new stage of capitalism from its infancy; that his early observations of 
underemployment in the slums of Bermondsey led him to focus on the labour 
dislocation that would emerge from the dumping practised by this new stage of 
capitalism; and that his New Liberal beliefs made him dwell on the emergence of 
low-wage industries as Britain failed to embrace this sort of capitalism. He 
earnestly believed that protection and other forms of state interference were 
appropriate policy tools for the industrial stage in which he lived. It is therefore not 
surprising that Ashley carried on the fight against the free traders after the 
publication of The Tariff Problem. In 1904 he wrote a summary of his protectionist 
position for the Economic Journal and, again at Chamberlain’s request, he 
published what amounted to a sequel to The Tariff Problem, entitled The Progress 
of the German Working Classes. Ashley employed this latter work to show that the 
protectionist policies of Imperial Germany had induced an improvement in the 
conditions of the German working class, partly because of the expansion of 
production that took place behind the tariff wall and partly because of the social 
welfare policies that were financed by the tariff revenue. His correspondence, 
lectures and less policy-oriented publications were also littered with references to 
the protectionist issue. 
The tariff reform movement, even with these contributions from Ashley, 
ultimately failed to win the hearts and minds of Britain. The defeat of this 
movement may be attributable to complex historical forces that are largely outside 
the control of the supporters of protection, such as Ashley and Hewins, and well 
beyond the scope of this centenary essay. It is nonetheless the case that Ashley, 
despite providing the protectionist movement with some much-needed academic 
credentials, failed to employ the sort of rhetorical tools that were needed to 
persuade the undecided reader to follow the protectionist banner. The impact of The 
Tariff Problem was, in the final analysis, hampered by Ashley’s own erudition. The 
work is replete with table upon table of trade statistics, divagations on American 
railroad practices and endless references to the sort of tedious facts found in blue 
books. These wanton displays of empirical evidence, so favoured by the historical 
economists, may have impressed some Edwardian academics, but they also broke 
up Ashley’s much-praised prose style and did not make for easy reading. Indeed, 
the very protectionist arguments that have been delineated in this section were only 
extracted from Ashley’s wider work after employing exegetical skills that one 
usually expects to use only when striving to comprehend far older, more arcane 
texts. I very much doubt that many of the non-economists who took a keen interest 
in the protectionist debate at this time, and there were many, would have had the 
patience to read the manifesto from cover the cover. 
Ashley’s rhetoric was also certainly not sufficient to shake the 
contemporary orthodox economists from their free trade beliefs. The orthodox 
reviewers nonetheless paid grudging respect to Ashley’s The Tariff Problem and, 
indeed, they accepted this publication as easily the best account of the protectionist 
position. It is this last quality, of course, which has made the book of lasting 
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interest. F.Y. Edgeworth, who made no secret of his commitment to the orthodox 
position on methodology, theory and policy issues, opens his review in the 
Economic Journal with the statement that Ashley ‘seems to deserve the distinction 
of having produced the best book on the Protectionist side of the controversy now 
running’ (1903, p. 572). Edgeworth himself, of course, was not convinced by 
Ashley’s arguments and he could not hide a mocking tone, declaring at one stage 
that these arguments were not wrong in the ‘grossest sense of the term’ (ibid.). Still, 
his opening endorsement of Ashley as the most sophisticated of the protectionists 
rings in one’s ears. A far more unusual reviewer was a youngish Bertrand Russell, 
who at this time was a very vocal expositor of free trade doctrines and whose 
opinion may be taken as that of a representative Edwardian liberal who had a good 
working knowledge of economics. Russell gave at least thirteen public speeches in 
defence of free trade in 1903 and he had very publicly withdrawn from the Fabian 
Society in the previous year partly because of that Society’s guarded support for 
Chamberlain (see Rempel et al. 1985, pp. 181ff). It was over this period that 
Russell wrote a polite review of The Tariff Problem for the Independent Review 
(1904a) and a harsher (and anonymous!) review for the Edinburgh Review (1904b). 
Like Edgeworth, Russell declared that the book was the ‘best presentation in 
existence of the case for Protection and Imperial Preference’, before proceeding to 
criticise the arguments contained therein (1904a, p. 186). He particularly took issue 
with Ashley’s claim that, under a regime of free trade, certain undesirable 
industries were prospering in the slums of Britain. This strange mix of respect and 
scorn was also reflected in Russell’s private correspondence, in which he declared 
that Ashley’s book was both ‘perhaps the ablest statement of the case’ and 
‘dishonest’ (6 December 1903, quoted in Rempel et al. 1985, p. 185). In fact, these 
sorts of double-edged assessments, whether they be by Edgeworth or Russell, 
neatly capture Ashley’s failure to convert his contemporaries to the protectionist 
faith: the free traders had effectively announced that his manifesto was ‘the best of 
a bad lot’ and then asked of the protectionists in general, ‘is this really the best that 
you have got?’ 
4 Conclusion 
Ashley continued to return to the themes he raised in The Tariff Problem in the 
years that followed, but he was not a man of one idea. He continued to pioneer the 
commerce degree at Birmingham, and his enormously successful history text for 
undergraduates in which he pushed his corporatist vision of society, entitled The 
Economic Organisation of England (1914), was derived from a decade of lectures 
he delivered at Birmingham. Unfortunately, however, Ashley’s shy, over-cautious 
delivery meant that he was respected rather than popular amongst the Birmingham 
undergraduate body and it is reported that his awkwardness made ‘tea-parties under 
his hospitable roof sometimes somewhat of an ordeal to the younger men’ 
(Muirhead 1932, p. 102). Ashley also continued to pursue his interest in the history 
of economic thought and in 1909 published a variorum edition of John Stuart Mill’s 
Principles of Political Economy, which contained detailed accounts of the changes 
in the successive editions of Mill’s work and which was sufficiently authoritative 
that some modern historians of economic thought continue to prefer it to the more 
recent Toronto edition. Similar industry was applied to his youthful interest in the 
controversies surrounding method, as reflected in his 1907 article for the Economic 
Journal entitled ‘The Present Position of Political Economy’, as well as in sound 
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scholarship within the field of economic history. The latter interest manifested itself 
in the posthumous publication of his research on the dietary habits of pre-modern 
England, entitled The Bread of our Forefathers (1928), and his role in founding the 
Economic History Society in the 1920s. Ashley took an entirely new career path in 
his later years only in matters relating to public administration. He readily became 
involved in various municipal bodies in Birmingham and served on countless 
government boards during the Great War. The most historically significant of these 
contributions was perhaps the work he did for the Board of Trade, which included a 
memorandum on the effects of war indemnities that he co-authored with J.M. 
Keynes. He was knighted for his services to the government in 1917, and his final 
years were defined by an increasing sense of satisfaction with having overcome 
adversity to build a successful and varied career. As his daughter recalled: ‘There is 
no doubt that he found a pleasant zest and amusement in the thought that he, the 
Bermondsey boy, the shy and awkward undergraduate, should meet and have 
intellectual companionship of so varied and intellectual company. His enjoyment 
was all the greater in that during his youth he had been shut into himself by his 
temperament, and in fact all his life he had no small talk and his links with his 
fellows were mainly intellectual’ (A. Ashley 1932, pp. 75-6). 
________________________________ 
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